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Carol Trevey* 
INTRODUCTION 
In addition to substandard conditions of confinement,1 the invo-
luntarily committed experience a stunning lack of privacy while insti-
tutionalized.2  One commentator relates a former patient’s descrip-
tion of life in an institution as follows: 
Everything is taken from you, you share a door-less room with as many 
other “crazy” women as the number of beds that can be fitted in al-
lows . . . . There is one bathroom with two (door-less, of course) toilet 
compartments . . . and never, never any privacy at all.  It is also a place 
where patients are instantly robbed of credibility.3 
Nevertheless, surprisingly little litigation has taken place over 
searches of psychiatric patients.  One recent case, however, suggests 
that such claims are likely to be unsuccessful.  In Serna v. Goodno,4 an 
entire treatment facility of “sexually dangerous persons” was subject 
 
 * J.D., 2011, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., 2006, Swarthmore College.  Many 
thanks to Professor Stephanos Bibas and the editors of the Journal of Constitutional Law for 
their assistance in preparing this Comment, as well as to my family and friends for their 
support. 
 1 See, e.g., Letter from Benton J. Campbell, U.S. Attorney, E.D.N.Y., & Loretta King, Acting 
Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Michael R. Bloomberg, Mayor of N.Y.C, 
(Jan. 15, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/
KCHC_findlet_01-30-09.pdf (noting “serious . . . sanitation issues” and other dangerous 
conditions in a public New York psychiatric hospital); see also Civil Rights Div. Special Li-
tig. Sec., Special Litigation Section Cases and Matters, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/findsettle.php#CRIPA%20Findings%20Letters 
(last visited May 11, 2011) (listing recent Department of Justice investigations of substan-
dard conditions in mental health facilities in Delaware, Georgia, New Jersey, New York, 
Oregon, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, California, Vermont, and North Caroli-
na). 
 2 E.g., Joseph O’Reilly & Bruce Sales, Privacy for the Institutionalized Mentally Ill:  Are Court-
Ordered Standards Effective?, 11 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 41, 49–51 (1987). 
 3 Susan Stefan, The Protection Racket:  Rape Trauma Syndrome, Psychiatric Labeling, and Law, 88 
NW. U. L. REV. 1271, 1315 (1994) (alteration in original) (quoting Ann Roy, Escape, in 
MADNESS NETWORK NEWS READER 18, 21 (Sherry Hirsch et al. eds., 1974)). 
 4 Serna v. Goodno, 567 F.3d 944 (8th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 465 (2009). 
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to visual body cavity searches5 because hospital staff suspected the 
presence of a cellular phone in the ward.6  These suspicionless 
searches were found to be “reasonable” under Bell v. Wolfish, which 
approved post-visitation visual body cavity searches of pretrial detai-
nees, due to security concerns related to the possibility of accessing 
child pornography or contacting potential new victims.7  Thus, the 
Eighth Circuit set an alarming precedent:  No individualized suspi-
cion whatsoever is required for even intrusive body searches of the 
involuntarily committed. 
Others have argued that in light of Safford v. Redding, the Serna 
court misconstrued Bell by not putting enough weight on the availa-
bility of less invasive alternatives to the searches at issue.8  Serna’s co-
rollary holding that Bell imposes no individualized suspicion re-
quirement is also an issue on which federal circuit opinions diverge.9  
But even conceding that the Serna court interpreted Bell correctly, the 
Eighth Circuit based its comparison of pretrial detainees and the in-
voluntarily committed on several questionable premises.  The court’s 
reliance on the Supreme Court’s and its own prior comparisons of 
the involuntarily committed and pretrial detainees is misleading in 
light of these precedents’ holdings.  The uncertain distinction be-
tween the standards articulated in Bell and Hudson v. Palmer, which 
governs searches of convicted prisoners, undermines the claim that 
Bell is sufficient to ensure that the involuntarily committed are 
treated better than convicted prisoners, as they are entitled.  Most 
importantly, research findings belie the court’s assumptions that a 
civil commitment determination is a good proxy for what risk an in-
dividual poses to institutional security, and that the involuntarily 
committed and pretrial detainees are comparable in terms of dange-
rousness. 
 
 5 Id. at 946.  As the Serna court described visual body cavity searches, “staff ask[] each pa-
tient to lift his genitals.  Staff also instruct[] each patient to turn, bend over slightly, and 
spread his buttocks.  There [is] no physical contact with the patients during the 
searches.”  Id. at 947. 
 6 Id. at 946. 
 7 Id. at 952–53, 955. 
 8 See Alexis Alvarez, Note, A Reasonable Search for Constitutional Protection in Serna v. Goodno:  
Involuntary Civil Commitment and the Fourth Amendment, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 363, 377–89 
(2010); see also Safford v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2642–43 (2009) (“[T]he T.L.O. con-
cern to limit a school search to reasonable scope requires the support of reasonable sus-
picion of danger or of resort to underwear for hiding evidence of wrongdoing before a 
search can reasonably make the quantum leap from outer clothes and backpacks to expo-
sure of intimate parts.”). 
 9 Gabriel M. Helmer, Note, Strip Search and the Felony Detainee:  A Case for Reasonable Suspi-
cion, 81 B.U. L. REV. 239, 262–79 (2001); see also infra note 37 (discussing circuit split). 
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This Comment therefore argues that allowing suspicionless 
searches at intake and after visitation, while otherwise requiring rea-
sonable suspicion, is more consistent with both the legal status of the 
involuntarily committed and empirical findings on their dangerous-
ness.  This proposal balances the traditional Fourth Amendment de-
mand of individualized suspicion, the needs of hospital administra-
tors, and the rights of involuntarily committed patients more fairly.  
Furthermore, some research on institutional violence suggests that a 
framework based on individualized suspicion would not be admini-
stratively unfeasible, and that such determinations could be reviewed 
in a way that shows deference to administrative judgment of security 
risks. 
Part I will discuss the Fourth Amendment as applied to convicted 
prisoners, pretrial detainees, and the civilly committed.  Part II will 
outline the role of individualized suspicion in Fourth Amendment ju-
risprudence.  Part III will discuss the legal status of the involuntarily 
committed, particularly precedents comparing the involuntarily 
committed and pretrial detainees, and civilly committed patients’ 
right to be free from punishment.  Part IV will discuss the role of 
dangerousness in legal standards for civil commitment.  Part V will 
discuss institutional concerns, including institutional violence and 
how individualized suspicion may be reconciled with the requirement 
that courts defer to the judgment of mental health professionals in 
Fourth Amendment analysis. 
I.  THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN PRISONS AND MENTAL HOSPITALS 
A. Convicted Prisoners:  Hudson v. Palmer 
Convicted prisoners retain any constitutional “rights not funda-
mentally inconsistent with imprisonment itself or . . . objectives of in-
carceration.”10  Hudson, however, held that prisoners do not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in their cells under the Fourth 
Amendment.11  In light of their confinement and the “needs and ob-
jectives of penal institutions,” society does not recognize any subjec-
tive expectations of privacy prisoners continue to hold as legitimate.12  
Any search of their cells or belongings will therefore not be reviewed 
for reasonableness because when an individual possesses no legiti-
 
 10 Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523 (1984) (citing examples of free speech and exercise 
of religion, due process, and freedom from cruel and unusual punishment). 
 11 Id. at 526. 
 12 Id. 
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mate expectation of privacy, an intrusion is not a “search” within the 
term’s meaning under the Fourth Amendment.13 
Because searches of inmate property are not subject to the Fourth 
Amendment’s limitations, they do not need to be based on individua-
lized suspicion, or, for that matter, reasonable.14  Even searches solely 
to harass inmates are permissible under the Fourth Amendment; in-
deed, the search at issue in Hudson was performed solely to harass the 
inmate.15  If a prisoner is subject to egregious harassment through 
searches, the Hudson Court reasoned that he may find a remedy in 
the Eighth Amendment instead.16  The Court dismissed the notion 
that a neutral search policy or individualized suspicion should be re-
quired in order to prevent harassment of inmates.17  Randomness is 
key to the effectiveness of prison search policies; a neutral plan would 
be predictable and would pose a likelihood of prisoners trying to dis-
cern the pattern—and succeeding—in order to avoid detection of 
contraband.18 
The main objective of incarceration that limits the rights of pris-
oners, thus allowing for their categorical exclusion from Fourth 
Amendment protection, is institutional security.19  The Court pointed 
out three significant characteristics of the convicted inmate popula-
tion that give security concerns precedence in any determination of 
prisoners’ rights.  First, a criminal conviction represents 
a demonstrated proclivity for antisocial criminal, and often violent, con-
duct . . . a lapse in ability to control and conform . . . behavior to the legi-
timate standards of society by the normal impulses of self-
restraint . . . [and] an inability to regulate . . . conduct in a way that re-
flects either a respect for law or an appreciation of the rights of others.20 
 
 13 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360–61 
(1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 14 Hudson, 468 U.S. at 529–30. 
 15 Id. at 520.  A later case, Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 76 (1987), announced any prison regula-
tion is constitutionally “valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”  
Id. at 89; see also Antoine McNamara, Note, The “Special Needs” of Prison, Probation, and Pa-
role, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 209, 228 (2007) (explaining the rule that the Court established in 
Turner).  The Supreme Court has not applied this new standard of review for prisoners’ 
constitutional claims in a Fourth Amendment case.  Id. at 229.  Nevertheless, this ruling 
would likely not reduce convicted prisoners’ Fourth Amendment rights because they are 
arguably less robust under Hudson, 468 U.S. at 526, as Turner requires prison regulations 
to relate to some prison administration interest. 
 16 Hudson, 468 U.S. at 530. 
 17 Id. at 528. 
 18 Id. at 529.  For a suggestion of how a neutral search policy could also be completely ran-
dom, see McNamara, supra note 15, at 227. 
 19 Hudson, 468 U.S. at 524. 
 20 Id. at 526. 
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In other words, criminal convictions justify a presumption that in-
mates pose a threat to institutional security because of past inability 
to follow rules or prior dangerous behavior.  The second salient cha-
racteristic of the prison population, which reinforces the first pre-
sumption, is the vast evidence showing that violence and contraband 
have reached epidemic levels in U.S. prisons.21  Third, and perhaps 
most importantly, convicted prisoners are eligible for punishment.  A 
restrictive regimen is not only consistent but also essential to accom-
plishing the deterrent, retributive, and correctional aims of the jus-
tice system.22 
B. Pretrial Detainees:  Bell v. Wolfish 
Bell articulated the Fourth Amendment standard for searches of 
pretrial detainees.23  In Bell, pretrial detainees at a facility also housing 
convicted prisoners alleged that their conditions of confinement vi-
olated numerous constitutional provisions.24  Their Fourth Amend-
ment claim challenged blanket visual body cavity searches after visita-
tion.25 
The Court found that pretrial detainees retain a greater expecta-
tion of privacy than convicted prisoners.26  Although convicted pris-
oners could theoretically receive some Fourth Amendment protec-
tion, their rights are circumscribed because incursions on their 
 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. at 524; see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546–47 (1979) (“[C]entral to all other cor-
rections goals is the institutional consideration of internal security within the corrections 
facilities themselves.” (alteration in original) (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 823 
(1974))). 
 23 Bell defined “pretrial detainees” as “persons who have been charged with a crime but who 
have not yet been tried on the charge.”  441 U.S. at 523. 
 24 The convicted prisoners housed in the facility were awaiting transportation to federal 
prison, serving short sentences, or awaiting trials on additional charges.  Id. at 524.  The 
center also housed witnesses in protective custody and persons in contempt of court.  Id.  
The pretrial detainees also claimed constitutional violations related to “overcrowded 
conditions, undue length of confinement . . . inadequate recreational, educational, and 
employment opportunities, insufficient staff, and objectionable restrictions on the pur-
chase and receipt of personal items and books.”  Id. at 527. 
 25 Id. at 558.  The inmates also challenged the reasonableness of conducting cell searches 
outside of their presence.  Id. at 555.  The Court held that conducting the searches out-
side of the inmates’ presence did not pose any additional intrusion beyond that of the 
searches themselves, which were not challenged.  Id. at 557.  The general Fourth 
Amendment standard for pretrial detainees that the Court articulated related to the facil-
ity’s visual body cavity search policy, so this Comment will only address that claim in de-
tail.  Id. at 558. 
 26 Id. at 545 (“A fortiori, pretrial detainees, who have not been convicted of any crimes, re-
tain at least those constitutional rights that we have held are enjoyed by convicted prison-
ers.”). 
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freedom are inherent to, and justified by, the purposes of punish-
ment.27  In contrast, pretrial detainees have a right to be entirely free 
from punishment because they have not been convicted of a crime.28  
Nevertheless, so long as there has been a neutral probable cause de-
termination,29 the government interest in ensuring presence at trial 
and “ultimately . . . service of their sentences” justifies continued de-
tainment.30 
Detention of pretrial detainees in a prison housing convicted 
prisoners invokes an additional strong interest in maintaining prison 
order.  The Court emphasized that this interest is not diminished by 
the detainees’ pretrial rather than convicted status.  In a telling foot-
note, the Court described characteristics of the pretrial population 
that create an equally substantial interest in security as there is with 
convicted prisoners: 
There is no basis for concluding that pretrial detainees pose any lesser 
security risk than convicted inmates. . . . In the federal system, a detainee 
is committed to the detention facility only because no other less drastic 
means can reasonably assure his presence at trial.  As a result, those who 
are detained prior to trial may in many cases be individuals who are 
charged with serious crimes or who have prior records.  They also may 
pose a greater risk of escape than convicted inmates.  This may be partic-
ularly true at [this facility,] . . . where the resident convicted inmates have 
been sentenced to only short terms of incarceration and many of the de-
tainees face the possibility of lengthy imprisonment if convicted.31 
Complementing this interest in institutional order is a policy of defe-
rence toward prison authorities’ judgment on issues related to day-to-
day operations.32  When evaluating any constitutional claim arising 
from prison conditions,33 courts will defer to administrators’ expertise 
unless the restriction is shown to be an “exaggerated” response to se-
curity concerns.34 
The Court concluded that a “reasonableness” test that is “not ca-
pable of precise definition or mechanical application” governs 
 
 27 Id. at 545–46 (“Lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation 
of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our 
penal system.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 
266, 285 (1948)). 
 28 Bell, 441 U.S. at 534. 
 29 Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111–14 (1975), cited in Bell, 441 U.S. at 534. 
 30 Bell, 441 U.S. at 534. 
 31 Id. at 546 n.28 (internal citations omitted). 
 32 Id. at 547–48; see, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84–85 (1987). 
 33 Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 528 (2006) (applying the Turner standard of deference to 
prison authorities in a First Amendment claim). 
 34 Bell, 441 U.S. at 547–48 (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974)). 
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searches of pretrial detainees.35  Beyond the Court’s invocation of the 
three principles above, it listed four factors to be considered:  “the 
scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which [the search] is 
conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it 
is conducted.”36  Although the Court described this holding as simply 
answering the question of “whether visual body-cavity inspec-
tions . . . can ever be conducted on less than probable cause,” notably 
absent from its analysis is an explicit requirement of individualized 
suspicion.37  Without any requirement of individualized suspicion, the 
reasonableness test, coupled with the Court’s admonition in Hudson 
that abusive searches of pretrial detainees were intolerable, makes the 
only practical difference between the Fourth Amendment protections 
of prisoners and pretrial detainees a ban on harassing searches of 
pretrial detainees.  This is particularly true in light of the Court’s fail-
ure to quantify the scope of a pretrial detainee’s legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy, thus providing no indication as to how much weight 
individual privacy concerns are to receive when balanced against in-
stitutional safety and deference to prison authorities.38 
 
 35 Id. at 559. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Helmer, supra note 9, at 262 (“[I]n his Bell concurrence, Justice Powell confirmed that 
the majority failed to articulate a level of cause required to strip search a detainee . . . .”); 
see also Powell v. Barrett, 541 F.3d 1298, 1308 (11th Cir. 2008) (“If the [Bell] majority had 
required reasonable suspicion for body cavity inspection strip searches of pretrial detai-
nees, Justice Powell would not have dissented at all.”).  The majority approach among the 
federal circuits interprets Bell as requiring some individualized suspicion because of its 
ambiguous characterization of the search in question as on “less than probable cause” 
and the presence of some suspicion in the facts of the case.  Helmer, supra note 9, at 262–
65.  The plaintiff in Serna argued for this interpretation, also relying on a prior Eighth 
Circuit ruling requiring reasonable suspicion for visual body cavity searches of misde-
meanor detainees.  Brief of Appellant at 26, Serna v. Goodno, 567 F.3d 944 (8th Cir. 
2009) (No. 05-3441); see also Jones v. Edwards, 770 F.2d 739, 741–42 (8th Cir. 1985) (find-
ing that a strip search of a misdemeanor detainee was unjustified under Bell in the ab-
sence of reasonable suspicion of the presence of weapons or contraband).  Because the 
Eighth Circuit, citing Powell, 541 F.3d at 1298, adopted the suspicionless balancing test in-
terpretation of Bell in its disposition of Serna, 567 F.3d 944, 950 (8th Cir. 2009), I will rely 
on this interpretation in my analysis of psychiatric hospital searches.  Needless to say, if 
individualized suspicion were required for searches of all pretrial detainees, there would 
be no question of its requirement in searches of civilly committed patients. 
 38 Helmer, supra note 9, at 260 (“[T]he Bell Court is unclear about what rights exist and the 
importance of those rights. . . . Justice Rehnquist’s silence on the importance of the indi-
vidual interest appears to end the balancing test without putting the weight of the indi-
vidual’s Fourth Amendment rights on the scale.”). 
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C. Involuntarily Committed Patients:  Serna v. Goodno 
Plaintiff Serna was involuntarily committed as a “sexually danger-
ous person” through the Minnesota Sex Offender Program.39  Com-
mitment to this program occurs when a “district court finds by clear 
and convincing evidence that the patient is a sexual psychopathic 
personality . . . evidencing ‘an utter lack of power to con-
trol . . . sexual impulses’ and who ‘is likely to engage in acts of harm-
ful sexual conduct.’”40  The purposes of these commitments are “to 
provide care and treatment” and “teach detainees how to control 
their dangerous sexual behaviors so that they can eventually return to 
the community.”41  In three years of confinement, Serna had not pos-
sessed any contraband.42 
The incident leading to the searches at issue was the discovery of a 
cellular phone carrying case in a common room open to patients, 
staff, and some visitors.43  A search of the area found no phone.44  A 
surveillance video showed specific patients who had recently been in 
the area, but not who had dropped the case.45  Hospital staff then 
immediately commenced room and visual body cavity searches of the 
entire facility.46  Serna only challenged the visual body cavity searches, 
which he claimed were unreasonable because the staff had no basis 
on which to suspect him of possessing the cellular phone and did not 
limit their search to patients who had been in the common area or 
possessed contraband in the past.47  The facility countered that it had 
the right to perform blanket visual body cavity searches in response to 
any “generalized suspicion of contraband.”48 
The Eighth Circuit asserted that in Andrews v. Neer, it had set forth 
the Fourth Amendment standard for seizures in psychiatric hospitals:  
objective reasonableness, the same as that applied to pretrial detai-
nees.49  The primary basis for imposing the same search standard for 
both groups was the similarity of institutional concerns over “safety 
 
 39 Serna, 567 F.3d at 946. 
 40 Senty-Haugen v. Goodno, 462 F.3d 876, 880 (8th Cir. 2006) (internal citation omitted). 
 41 Serna, 567 F.3d at 946 n.3 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 42 Id. at 947. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. (“Administrators did not focus their search efforts on the patients identified in the 
surveillance tape or on patients with a recent history of possessing cell phones or other 
contraband.”). 
 48 Id. 
 49 See id. at 948 (citing Andrews v. Neer, 253 F.3d 1052, 1061 (8th Cir. 2001)). 
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and security of guards,” “order,” and “efficiency of . . . operations.”50  
The court noted that the government’s justifications for confining 
each group are “similar”:  suspects are detained before trial “if ‘no 
condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure . . . the 
safety of any other person and the community,’” and a person may be 
committed as a sexually dangerous person on a finding of “future 
dangerousness.”51  The court also likened its comparison of pretrial 
detainees and the civilly committed to that in Youngberg v. Romeo, 
where the Supreme Court made a similar analogy in determining civil 
committees’ liberty interests in substantive due process claims regard-
ing conditions of confinement in psychiatric institutions.52  Based on 
its ruling in Andrews and the similarities between pretrial detainees 
and civil committees, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the same 
Fourth Amendment standard should apply to both groups and that 
Bell therefore governs searches of the involuntarily committed.53 
Deferring to the hospital administrators’ judgment, the court 
found that the searches were reasonable under the Bell standard de-
spite their suspicionless application and the court’s concern over the 
immediate resort to such intrusive methods.54  Consistent with Bell, 
the court noted the facility’s concern that cellular phones would al-
low patients to contact past or future victims, access child pornogra-
phy, or transmit photographs of the facilities to aid in escape.55  The 
staff had also found evidence that a contraband phone was in the fa-
cility, which had experienced security issues related to cellular 
phones in the past.  Thus “concrete information and not mere-
ly . . . ‘perceived security concerns’” justified the searches, making 
them reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.56 
II.  SUSPICIONLESS SEARCHES UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
Searches of patients’ persons such as those in Serna are likely the 
only psychiatric hospital searches that traditional Fourth Amendment 
doctrine does not cover.  Most courts would find that civilly commit-
ted patients do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their 
belongings while in the hospital, thus removing searches of their 
 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1); Hince v. Keefe, 632 N.W.2d 577, 588 (Minn. 2001)). 
 52 Id. at 949; see Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 320–21 (1982). 
 53 Serna, 567 F.3d at 949. 
 54 Id. at 954–55. 
 55 Id. at 953. 
 56 Id. (internal citation omitted). 
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property from the Fourth Amendment’s coverage.57  Moreover, if law 
enforcement could perform a particular warrantless search, such as a 
Terry frisk, it would be presumptively reasonable for hospital staff to 
do so because they have more leeway than law enforcement under 
the Fourth Amendment.58  Therefore, depending on their intrusive-
ness, searches by hospital staff where there is at least reasonable sus-
picion of wrongdoing or possession of contraband may be constitu-
tional.  It is suspicionless searches of a patient’s person by hospital 
staff that are questionable, as law enforcement could not perform 
such a search under nearly any circumstances.59  Because they are un-
related to law enforcement, the “reasonableness” prong of the Fourth 
Amendment governs the constitutionality of these searches under ei-
ther the “special needs” doctrine or what some commentators have 
described as the “reduced expectation of privacy” doctrine.60 
 
 57 See John B. Wefing, The Performance of the New Jersey Supreme Court at the Opening of the Twen-
ty-First Century:  New Cast, Same Script, 32 SETON HALL L. REV. 769, 802 (2003) (describing 
the New Jersey Supreme Court’s “willingness to give defendants substantially more pro-
tection than that afforded under the federal constitution or guaranteed in most other 
states” in State v. Stott, which found the involuntarily committed retain an expectation of 
privacy in their belongings); see also State v. Stott, 794 A.2d 120, 127–28 (N.J. 2002) (find-
ing that involuntarily committed psychiatric patients have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in their hospital rooms, even when those rooms are shared with other patients).  
See generally Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, Hospital as Within Constitutional Provision For-
bidding Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 28 A.L.R. 6TH 245 (2007) (recounting cases that 
have held no reasonable expectation of privacy exists in hospital rooms). 
 58 See, e.g., Stott, 794 A.2d at 124, 132 (noting without objection that “hospital staff personnel 
regularly search the patients’ rooms, including their wardrobes,” and arguing that “[t]he 
participation of law enforcement officers transformed this search from what might have 
been an objectively reasonable intrusion by hospital staff into the kind of warrantless po-
lice action prohibited by our federal and State Constitutions”); Ricardo J. Bascuas, Fourth 
Amendment Lessons from the Highway and the Subway:  A Principled Approach to Suspicionless 
Searches, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 719, 758 (2007) (“[T]he Court has repeatedly suggested that 
whether criminal proceedings are likely to result is an important consideration in decid-
ing the legality or reasonableness of a suspicionless search.”). 
 59 See Bascuas, supra note 58, at 758 (“‘Ordinary’ searches—those that arise in a criminal 
investigation—are still held to require some degree of individualized suspicion, whether 
probable cause or reasonable suspicion.”).  But see id. at 758–59 (“[T]he Court has al-
lowed evidence from suspicionless checkpoints to support felony prosecutions . . . . The 
searches in those cases were justified as being necessary to fulfill some professed govern-
ment ‘special need’ . . . .”); Ric Simmons, Searching for Terrorists:  Why Public Safety Is Not a 
Special Need, 59 DUKE L.J. 843, 888–89 (2010) (“[T]o state that the purpose of the search 
is distinct from the ‘normal need for law enforcement’ is merely a semantic game because 
the special need that justifies the weaker search standard is usually nothing more than the 
policy justification for the original criminalization of the conduct. . . . In this sense, the 
suspicionless search jurisprudence is little more than an exercise in redefining the nature 
of criminal activity and thereby redefining the permissible methods of detecting that ac-
tivity.”). 
 60 See Derek Regensburger, DNA Databases and the Fourth Amendment:  The Time Has Come to 
Reexamine the Special Needs Exception to the Warrant Requirement and the Primary Purpose Test, 
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A. The Camara-Terry Balancing Test61 
The balancing inquiries of the special needs and reduced expecta-
tion of privacy doctrines originated in Terry v. Ohio62 and Camara v. 
Municipal Court of San Francisco.63  Terry introduced a focus on the rea-
sonableness clause of the Fourth Amendment and created a new cat-
egory of searches subject to neither the warrant nor probable cause 
requirements.64  A contemporaneous case, Camara, was crucial to the 
Terry Court’s holding.65  While still requiring a judicially issued war-
rant, Camara held that warrants for a building inspection could be is-
sued on less than probable cause.66  Under Camara, a search may be 
reasonable where a valid government interest—in Camara, universal 
compliance with the housing code—justifies the intrusion.67  In Terry, 
the Court further emphasized Camara’s assertion that “there is no 
ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing 
the need to search . . . against the invasion which the 
search . . . entails.”68 
The impact of Camara and Terry was to introduce an interest-
balancing inquiry into Fourth Amendment analysis in lieu of a strict 
distinction between non-searches, searches requiring warrants and 
probable cause, and categorical exceptions to the warrant require-
 
19 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 319, 343 (2009) (distinguishing between special needs searches 
and searches where individuals had lessened expectations of privacy due to involvement 
with the criminal justice system); Simmons, supra note 59, at 855 (“Courts have . . . used 
the ‘reasonableness’ language [of the Fourth Amendment] to support exceptions to this 
general rule [of requiring a warrant and probable cause].”). 
 61 I adopt this term from Wayne R. LaFave’s treatise on search and seizure.  E.g., 4 WAYNE R. 
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE:  A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 9.6(g) (4th ed. 
2004). 
 62 392 U.S. 1, 29–30 (1968) (finding that preserving the security of police officers is a special 
concern justifying minimal “protective searches” of a suspect’s outer garments when he or 
she is taken into custody, and outweighing a suspect’s expectation of privacy). 
 63 387 U.S. 523, 531–33 (1967) (finding that an individual’s expectation of privacy in private 
property is not outweighed by needs of administrative officials to perform a warrantless 
inspection of the property justified by time, infeasibility of obtaining a warrant, or mi-
nimal nature of demands on occupants). 
 64 Terry, 392 U.S. at 20 (“[W]e deal here with an entire rubric of police conduct . . . which 
historically has not been, and as a practical matter could not be, subjected to the warrant 
procedure.”); Scott E. Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics:  Undoing the Mischief of 
Camara and Terry, 72 MINN. L. REV. 383, 395–96, 401–02 (1988) (describing the reasona-
bleness balancing test developed in Camara and Terry for use in “stop-and-frisk” proce-
dures). 
 65 Terry, 392 U.S. at 20–21 (citing Camara, 387 U.S. at 523, 534–35, 536–37). 
 66 Camara, 387 U.S. at 539. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 (citing, inter alia, Camara, 387 U.S. at 536–37). 
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ment.69  Between non-searches and searches requiring a warrant falls 
a category of searches allowed based on “a balancing of interests 
where the search or seizure at issue constitutes only a minimal intru-
sion.”70  Camara also extended the protection of the Fourth Amend-
ment to non-criminal enforcement activities, which in turn widened 
the government interests that may weigh in favor of such an intrusion 
beyond law enforcement.71 
B. Special Needs and Reduced Expectation of Privacy Searches 
Special needs searches, loosely defined, are searches whose “pri-
mary purpose” is something other than collection of evidence for 
criminal prosecutions.72  Justice Blackmun coined this term in his 
concurrence in New Jersey v. T.L.O.,73 though the reach of this doc-
trine has extended far beyond Blackmun’s likely intended meaning 
to encompass such disparate scenarios as “railroad workers, Customs 
Department employees, and school children,” among others.74  If a 
non-law-enforcement purpose is identified, courts evaluate the 
search’s reasonableness under a balancing test that “undertake[s] a 
context-specific inquiry, examining closely the competing private and 
public interests advanced by the parties.”75 
Notably, the Supreme Court recently may have created a separate 
exception to the warrant and probable cause requirements for proba-
tioners and parolees.76  In Samson v. California,77 the Court did not re-
 
 69 4 LAFAVE, supra note 61, § 9.1. 
 70 3 LAFAVE, supra note 61, § 5.4(c). 
 71 Camara, 387 U.S. at 539. 
 72 E.g., Simmons, supra note 59, at 887–88 (“The Court uses different language in different 
contexts—the search must not be ‘aimed at the discovery of evidence of crime’; it must 
serve ‘special needs[] beyond the normal need for law enforcement;’ or it must fulfill a 
purpose other than ‘general crime control’ but the requirement itself remains constant.” 
(alteration in original)).  The “primary purpose” test is criticized for its malleability, sug-
gesting that conclusively defining the special needs category of searches is difficult.  See, 
e.g., Bascuas, supra note 58, at 757, 759 (arguing that the “primary purpose” test creates 
“arbitrary” results and “can provide a convenient pretext for circumventing any require-
ment of individualized suspicion”). 
 73 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring); Edwin J. Butterfoss, A Suspicionless 
Search and Seizure Quagmire:  The Supreme Court Revives the Pretext Doctrine and Creates Another 
Fine Fourth Amendment Mess, 40 CREIGHTON L. REV. 419, 449–50, 454, 459–60 (2007) (de-
scribing the creation of the “special needs” test and its eventual adoption by the Court). 
 74 Butterfoss, supra note 73, at 449–50, 454, 459–60 (arguing that Blackmun intended to 
limit the cases in which a balancing test could be used only to those where obtaining a 
warrant would not be feasible). 
 75 Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 314 (1997). 
 76 See, e.g., Regensburger, supra note 60, at 354. 
 77 547 U.S. 848, 857 (2006). 
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quire a non-law-enforcement purpose for the searches at issue and 
explicitly noted that it was not deciding the cases under the special 
needs doctrine.78  Whether this case marks a total abandonment of 
the special needs doctrine, creates an exception for searches of any 
individuals with a “diminished” expectation of privacy, or creates a 
distinct category for probationers and parolees remains to be seen.79  
Regardless, the Court applied the same interest-balancing in these 
cases as it has in the special needs cases, although without requiring a 
special government need before moving to this analysis.  The Court 
also noted the reduced expectations of privacy of parolees and proba-
tioners when weighing their interests against the government’s to 
find suspicionless searches reasonable, but a diminished expectation 
of privacy has been a characteristic of many, if not most, groups sub-
ject to special needs searches.80  Therefore, whether searches of the 
involuntarily committed fall in this or the special needs category is ir-
relevant to the ultimate analysis. 
C. Individualized Suspicion 
Traditionally, reasonableness was thought to demand some de-
gree of individualized suspicion because of the Fourth Amendment’s 
roots in the colonists’ distaste for general warrants.81  The introduc-
tion of the interest-balancing framework in Camara and Terry signifi-
 
 78 Id. at 852 n.3; Butterfoss, supra note 73, at 492–93; Regensburger, supra note 60, at 355. 
 79 See Butterfoss, supra note 73, at 492 (“If it seems radical to suggest the Court should ab-
andon its fairly recently developed special needs doctrine and primary purpose test when 
evaluating suspicionless searches and seizures, one answer is that it may already have 
done so.”); Regensburger, supra note 60, at 356 (“[Samson and United States v. Knights, 534 
U.S. 112 (2001),] seem to signal an end to the special needs analysis where the subject of 
the search has a reduced expectation of privacy, reverting back to Justice White’s applica-
tion of the balancing test from T.L.O.”). 
 80 Regensburger, supra note 60, at 355–56; see also Simmons, supra note 59, at 866–67 
(“[J]ust like the schoolchildren in T.L.O. and the heavily regulated businesses in Camara, 
the Court noted [in O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 717 (1987),] that office workers 
have a diminished expectation of privacy in their workplace.”). 
 81 Thomas K. Clancy, The Role of Individualized Suspicion in Assessing the Reasonableness of 
Searches and Seizures, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 483, 527 (1995) (“The historical abuses associated 
with search and seizure practices involved broad grants of official authority pursuant to a 
general warrant.  General warrants were the perceived evil.”); see also Stanford v. Texas, 
379 U.S. 476, 510 (1965) (“Vivid in the memory of the newly independent Americans 
were those general warrants known as writs of assistance under which officers of the 
Crown had so bedeviled the colonists.  The hated writs of assistance had given customs of-
ficials blanket authority to search where they pleased for goods imported in violation of 
the British tax laws.”). 
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cantly relaxed the individualized suspicion requirement.82  In some 
recent cases, however, the Supreme Court has reemphasized that in-
dividualized suspicion is the norm and that suspicionless searches are 
limited exceptions to the Fourth Amendment.83  This suggests that 
while individualized suspicion is not an “irreducible” component of 
reasonableness, a special need may not automatically defeat the pre-
sumption that it is required.84  Yet predicting when individualized 
suspicion is required for these searches is a difficult task; various 
commentators have noted that the Court’s decisions are “ad hoc,”85 
produce “unpredictable and illogical results,”86 and that the doctrine 
is in a “state of disarray.”87 
While this doctrinal confusion is beyond the scope of this Com-
ment, some common characteristics of the cases in which individua-
lized suspicion has not been required have been noted:  “[A] limited 
intrusion on privacy, reduced expectation of privacy on the part of 
the subjects, and the fact that imposing a warrant requirement would 
be impractical and would frustrate the government purpose.”88  
Searches of psychiatric facilities clearly meet the third and second cri-
teria, but searches of patients’ persons—much less visual body cavity 
searches like those in Serna—clearly are not “limited intrusion[s].”89  
In fact, Bell is the only case where a suspicionless strip-search has ever 
been permitted, and even suspicionless searches of the home have 
been limited to cases where the subjects are “convicted criminals un-
der state supervision.”90  In addition, although they are, in a sense, 
 
 82 Clancy, supra note 81, at 533 (“[T]he Court has abandoned any pretense . . . that indivi-
dualized suspicion remains the preferred model for any searches and seizures to be rea-
sonable.”); see also id. at 546–47. 
 83 See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000) (“A search or seizure is ordina-
rily unreasonable in the absence of individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.  While such 
suspicion is not an ‘irreducible’ component of reasonableness we have recognized only 
limited circumstances in which the usual rule does not apply.”) (citations omitted); 
Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 308 (1997) (“The Fourth Amendment . . . generally bars 
officials from undertaking a search or seizure absent individualized suspicion.  Searches 
conducted without grounds for suspicion of particular individuals have been upheld, 
however, in ‘certain limited circumstances.’” (citation omitted)). 
 84 See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37. 
 85 Butterfoss, supra note 73, at 434. 
 86 Bascuas, supra note 58, at 723. 
 87 Simmons, supra note 59, at 887. 
 88 Id. at 867–68. 
 89 Simmons, supra note 59, at 867; see supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 90 Jessica R. Feierman & Riya S. Shah, Protecting Personhood:  Legal Strategies to Combat the Use of 
Strip Searches on Youth in Detention, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 67, 78 & n.87 (2007); cf. Kaaryn 
Gustafson, The Criminalization of Poverty, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643, 708 (2009) 
(“[O]utside of parolees and probationers, the special needs exception had nev-
er . . . been extended so far as to allow government searches of individuals’ homes.”). 
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searches of the body, the Court has also consistently portrayed the in-
vasion drug tests pose “as minimal or even ‘negligible.’”91 
Serna thus represents a departure in suspicionless search doctrine 
by allowing a highly intrusive search method without individualized 
suspicion outside the criminal justice context.  Such a deviation may 
be warranted, but it should be so only if there are strong justifications 
to group involuntary civil commitments in the same category as those 
under criminal supervision—namely, pretrial detainees.  The remain-
ing Parts argue that the Eighth Circuit’s justifications in this regard 
are unconvincing. 
III.  LEGAL STATUS OF THE INVOLUNTARILY COMMITTED:  CRITICISM OF 
SERNA’S INTERPRETATION 
A. Use of Force and Conditions of Confinement Precedents:  Andrews and 
Youngberg 
Although the Fourth Amendment standard for the civilly commit-
ted was an issue of first impression in Serna, the court argued that 
precedent required psychiatric patients to be treated as pretrial de-
tainees.92  Civil committees’ Fourth Amendment claims, however, are 
distinguishable from the cases that the Serna opinion discusses.  
While these cases provide some support for comparing the civilly 
committed and pretrial detainees, they do not mandate it.  If these 
cases are not controlling, requiring some individualized suspicion in 
psychiatric hospital searches is possible. 
On closer examination, Andrews does not seem to impose a Fourth 
Amendment standard for civil committees.93  As the opinion pointed 
out, the Fourth Amendment applies to arrestees’ excessive force 
claims, whereas pretrial detainees must bring due process claims 
against excessive force.94  Although grounded in separate constitu-
tional rights, both groups’ claims are evaluated under the same stan-
dard:  objective reasonableness.95  It was therefore immaterial wheth-
 
 91 Feierman & Shah, supra note 90, at 78 (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 823 
(2002); Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 658 (1995); Nat’l Treasury Emps. Un-
ion v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 
626 (1989)). 
 92 See Serna v. Goodno, 567 F.3d 944, 948–49 (8th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 165 
(2009). 
 93 See id. at 948; Andrews v. Neer, 253 F.3d 1051, 1060–61 (8th Cir. 2001). 
 94 Andrews, 253 F.3d at 1060 (“[E]valuation of excessive-force claims brought by pre-trial 
detainees . . . [is] grounded in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments rather than the 
Fourth Amendment.”). 
 95 Id. at 1061. 
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er civil committees were compared to arrestees or pretrial detainees 
in Andrews, so long as the court chose objective reasonableness over 
the less protective Eighth Amendment standard for cruel and un-
usual punishment.96 
The question in Andrews, therefore, was which Amendment covers 
claims of excessive force in a psychiatric hospital, not how to apply 
the Fourth Amendment to psychiatric patients.97  In equating pretrial 
detainees’ and psychiatric patients’ excessive force claims, the An-
drews court found that civil committees’ excessive force claims are re-
ally due process claims.98  Nevertheless, one of the Serna court’s most 
forceful arguments was the need to apply a consistent Fourth 
Amendment standard to both searches and seizures of psychiatric pa-
tients.99  Because it did not actually put forth a Fourth Amendment 
seizure standard for civil committees in Andrews, however, the Serna 
court could have adopted a different search standard without risking 
this inconsistency. 
The Eight Circuit’s reliance on the Supreme Court’s analogy be-
tween pretrial detainees and the civilly committed in Youngberg is si-
milarly erroneous.100  Youngberg held that “restrictions on [the] liber-
ty” of any civilly confined person must be “reasonably related to 
legitimate government objectives and not tantamount to punish-
ment.”101  Youngberg’s comparison of the two groups therefore does 
not require that they be treated identically.  In fact, Youngberg man-
dates that the groups’ rights differ according to the purposes of their 
confinement.102  Youngberg accords the civilly committed rights to 
freedom from unreasonable restraints and to “minimally adequate 
training” beyond those of pretrial detainees because the purpose of 
 
 96 See id. at 1060–61; see also Lewis v. Downey, 581 F.3d 467, 473–74 (7th Cir. 2009) (“In 
some contexts, such as claims of deliberate indifference to medical needs, the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendment standards are essentially interchangeable.  But the distinction 
between the two constitutional protections assumes some importance for excessive force 
claims because the Due Process Clause, which prohibits all ‘punishment,’ affords broader 
protection than the Eighth Amendment’s protection against only punishment that is 
‘cruel and unusual.’  (citations omitted) (quoting Wilson v. Williams, 83 F.3d 870, 875 
(7th Cir.1996))).  But see Rosalie Berger Levinson, Time to Bury the Shocks the Conscience 
Test, 13 CHAP. L. REV. 307, 329 (2010) (“Despite the distinction between pretrial detai-
nees and convicted felons drawn by the Supreme Court, most appellate courts have re-
quired detainees alleging excessive force [under the Due Process Clause] . . . to meet the 
same standard that convicted felons must meet under the Eighth Amendment.”). 
 97 Andrews, 253 F.3d at 1060. 
 98 Id. at 1060–61. 
 99 Serna v. Goodno, 567 F.3d 944, 948 (8th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 165 (2009). 
100 See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 320–21 (1982); Serna, 567 F.3d at 949. 
101 Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 320. 
102 See id. at 320–22. 
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their confinement is “custodial care or compulsory treatment” as op-
posed to warehousing until trial.103 
B. The Right to Be Free from Punishment 
Civil detainees face a heavy burden in challenging punitive condi-
tions of confinement.104  Nevertheless, courts reviewing these chal-
lenges have consistently emphasized Youngberg’s holding that a con-
fined person not convicted of a crime is entitled to better treatment 
than a convicted prisoner.105  This is particularly true for psychiatric 
patients, the purpose of whose confinement is not only incapacitation 
but also treatment.106 
Despite the difficulty of showing that conditions of confinement 
amount to punishment, the relevance of the right to be free from 
punishment in Fourth Amendment analysis should not turn on 
whether a search or seizure practice is so egregious as to be puni-
tive.107  Rather, the right to be free from punishment requires civil de-
tainees to receive more Fourth Amendment protection than in a 
criminal setting.108  If a civil committee may not be “confined in con-
ditions identical to, similar to, or more restrictive than . . . his crimi-
nal counterparts,” then he should not be as subject to searches and 
seizures.109  Courts that have applied a pretrial detainee standard to 
civil detainees’ excessive force or seizure claims have relied on pre-
 
103 Id. at 321–22, 324 (quoting Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972)); see also Eric S. 
Janus & Wayne A. Logan, Substantive Due Process and the Involuntary Confinement of Sexually 
Violent Predators, 35 CONN. L. REV. 319, 327 (2003) (arguing that civilly committed sexually 
violent predators have rights to “substantially more than . . . mere warehousing”). 
104 See, e.g., Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 263 (2001) (rejecting “as applied” ex post facto 
and double jeopardy challenges to conditions of civil confinement).  See generally Janus & 
Logan, supra note 103 (detailing the difficulties of challenging civil confinement condi-
tions on substantive due process grounds, and proposing that civilly committed sex of-
fenders have rights to “more than . . . warehousing” in spite of Seling v. Young). 
105 E.g., Sharp v. Weston, 233 F.3d 1166, 1172–73 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Youngberg, 457 
U.S. at 322). 
106 Janus & Logan, supra note 103, at 345, 347 (arguing that the police commitment power 
may not be invoked absent a right to treatment); Nancy K. Rhoden, The Limits of Liberty:  
Deinstitutionalization, Homelessness, and Libertarian Theory, 31 EMORY L.J. 375, 385 n.55, 386 
(1982) (summarizing federal courts’ stance on and the extent of scholarly argument 
about institutionalized persons’ right to treatment). 
107 See Andrews v. Neer, 253 F.3d 1052, 1060–61 (8th Cir. 2001). 
108 See Davis v. Rennie, 264 F.3d 86, 99–100, 102 (1st Cir. 2001) (rejecting the shocks the 
conscience standard in favor of a Fourth Amendment objective reasonableness standard 
for involuntarily committed patients’ excessive force claims because they are “in the 
state’s custody because of mental illness, not culpable conduct”); Andrews, 253 F.3d at 
1061. 
109 Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 932 (9th Cir. 2004). 
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cisely this reasoning, likening civil commitment to pretrial detention 
because the excessive force standard for pretrial detainees prohibits a 
wider range of seizures than the Eighth Amendment.110 
While the Serna court commented that there is no reason to apply 
different standards for searches and seizures, comparing searches of 
civil detainees to pretrial detainees is a poor fit because of the lesser 
distinction between the protections for each group.111  The difference 
between application of the Bell standard for searches of pretrial de-
tainees and the Hudson standard for convicted prisoners is unclear.  
For both groups, suspicionless searches related to security justifica-
tions are permissible and harassment is not.  Although the Hudson 
standard indirectly allows harassment by denying prison inmates any 
Fourth Amendment protection, the Eighth Amendment may protect 
prisoners from harassing searches unrelated to prison security.112  In-
deed, that deference to institutional decision-making and the invoca-
tion of institutional security mandated the outcome in Serna despite 
the court’s concerns over immediate resort to intrusive, blanket 
searches113 demonstrates the difficulty plaintiffs face in challenging 
search practices that fall short of harassment under Bell.  Further-
more, even if Bell prohibits some searches that both Hudson and the 
Eighth Amendment would allow for prisoners, from the patient’s 
perspective, frequent blanket searches for security purposes bear lit-
tle difference from searches conducted solely for harassment; either 
way, the intrusion feels unjustified because of a lack of wrongdoing.114  
Serna therefore prevents the involuntarily committed from using the 
Fourth Amendment to ensure their conditions of confinement vis-à-
 
110 Davis, 264 F.3d at 99–100, 102; Andrews, 253 F.3d at 1061. 
111 See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 529–30 (1984) (holding that the Fourth Amendment 
does not protect prisoners because they retain no legitimate expectation of privacy, and 
that the protections afforded by the Eighth Amendment provide their only recourse 
against harassment); Serna v. Goodno, 567 F.3d 944, 949–50 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding 
that the Bell reasonableness test imposes no individualized suspicion requirement (citing 
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 563 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting in part)). 
112 See Hudson, 468 U.S. at 520, 529–30 (“Our holding that respondent does not have a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy enabling him to invoke the protections of the Fourth 
Amendment does not mean that he is without a remedy for calculated harassment unre-
lated to prison needs. . . . The Eighth Amendment always stands as a protection against 
‘cruel and unusual punishments.’”); Serna, 567 F.3d at 950–51. 
113 The court further contended that the manner in which the searches were conducted 
supported their reasonableness.  Serna, 567 F.3d at 955 (noting that the searches were 
“conducted privately, safely, and professionally”).  A complete analysis of the legal or con-
stitutional significance of the manner in which searches are conducted in Fourth 
Amendment claims is outside the scope of this Comment. 
114 Cf. Butterfoss, supra note 73, at 487 (“As a law abiding citizen . . . [i]t is no comfort to me 
that the government intrusion is merely for a ‘regulatory’ purpose.”). 
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vis searches are better than those of prisoners, to which their civil de-
tainee status entitles them.115 
This reasoning, however, could be interpreted to require courts 
automatically to increase the Fourth Amendment rights of the civilly 
committed if the rights of prisoners are expanded.  For example, if 
the Supreme Court overruled Hudson and required reasonable suspi-
cion for prison searches, civil committees could argue for requiring 
probable cause or warrants before a search.  This outcome is obvious-
ly unacceptable if courts are required to prohibit search practices 
that are appropriate to the institutional setting and without which se-
curity would be severely compromised. 
The fear of formalistically having to expand psychiatric patients’ 
Fourth Amendment rights to an absurd degree to maintain their dif-
ference from prisoners, however, is more a hypothetical than a se-
rious possibility.  It is unlikely that convicted prisoners’ right to priva-
cy will ever be expanded much beyond Hudson because of their 
eligibility for punishment as well as the ongoing, serious security 
problems of prisons.116  Even if prisoners’ rights were expanded in 
such a way that affording the civilly committed more protection 
would be completely impracticable, this is not the case with merely 
requiring individualized suspicion in searches of their persons.  
Moreover, courts that have addressed Fourth Amendment seizures, 
excessive force claims, and other challenges to confinement condi-
tions in psychiatric hospitals agree with this reasoning and have not 
indicated that formalistic overexpansion of the rights of the civilly 
committed is a significant concern.117 
IV.  DANGEROUSNESS AND CIVIL COMMITMENT LEGAL STANDARDS 
Serna’s comparison of the dangerousness of the civilly committed 
to the dangerousness of pretrial detainees is tenuous.  Serna is correct 
that they are nominally similar:  a finding of “dangerousness” is re-
quired for most categories of civil mental health.  Its reliance on civil 
commitment dangerousness findings, however, is a poor fit with 
Fourth Amendment reasoning. 
Implicit in the court’s comparison is a reference to the Hudson 
and Bell language asserting that the legal status of prisoners and pre-
 
115 See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 320–21 (1982); see also Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 
913, 932 (9th Cir. 2004). 
116 See Hudson, 468 U.S. at 526. 
117 See Jones, 393 F.3d at 932; Davis v. Rennie, 264 F.3d 86, 99–101 (1st Cir. 2001); Andrews v. 
Neer, 253 F.3d 1052, 1061 (8th Cir. 2001). 
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trial detainees justifies the inference that they pose an actual dan-
ger.118  That is, a criminal conviction, or pending charges coupled 
with a finding of dangerousness, suggests that someone is likely to be 
a security risk in the prison setting, thus making blanket searches of 
these populations reasonable.119  But while the sexually violent preda-
tors in Serna were committed under a statutory finding of dangerous-
ness, this is not a requirement in many mental health commitments.  
In addition, although there may be enough overlap between criminal 
convictions or charges and a real risk of danger to defend a blanket 
presumption, the connection is less convincing with regard to mental 
health commitments both because of what qualifies as “dangerous-
ness” and how difficult dangerous behavior in psychiatric patients is 
to predict. 
A. The Incompatibility of Fourth Amendment Analysis and Legal Criteria for 
Civil Commitment 
Civil commitment of the mentally ill may occur under either the 
police or parens patriae powers.  Involuntary civil commitment origi-
nated under the parens patriae power, which allows the state to hold 
and forcibly treat the mentally ill for their own well-being.120  Under 
the police power, the state may also detain the mentally ill in the pub-
lic interest to prevent them from harming themselves or others.121  As 
the deinstitutionalization movement and constitutional limitations on 
commitment of the 1960s and 1970s introduced a more legalistic civil 
commitment process, the police power took precedence as the basis 
for most psychiatric commitments.122 
However, presence of a parens patriae or police power justification 
does not automatically give the government the power to confine.  A 
mentally ill person who poses no risk to himself or others may not be 
confined simply because treatment would be in his best interest.123  
Likewise, while a dangerously mentally ill person may be confined 
even if he is untreatable, the state may not confine a dangerous per-
 
118 Hudson, 468 U.S. at 529; Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546 n.28 (1979). 
119 Hudson, 468 U.S. at 529; Bell, 441 U.S. at 546 n.28. 
120 Developments in the Law, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1190, 1207–
10 (1974). 
121 Id. at 1222–23. 
122 See Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, supra note 120, at 1205 (“Recent statutory enact-
ments appear to indicate a trend toward restricting involuntary civil commitment to the 
dangerous mentally ill and toward limiting the type and increasing the severity of harm 
necessary to support a finding of dangerousness.”); Rhoden, supra note 106, at 386–87. 
123 O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975). 
June 2011] PRISONERS OF THE MIND 1455 
 
son who has neither a mental disorder nor been convicted of a crime, 
even if it would be in the public interest.124  An individual must be 
both mentally ill and exhibit “legally relevant behavior” for his civil 
confinement to be legitimate.125  More importantly, there must be a 
causal connection between the two.126 
There are civil commitment mechanisms in addition to the tradi-
tional findings of mental illness and danger to oneself or others.  A 
criminal defendant may be committed if he is incompetent to stand 
trial—incapable of consulting with his lawyer or rationally under-
standing the charges and proceedings, or, put more simply, of “assist-
ing in preparing his defense.”127  An incompetent defendant may be 
held for a “reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether 
there is a substantial probability that he will attain that capacity.”128  
Many states, however, continue to allow indefinite commitments of 
the incompetent without a finding of dangerousness, even though 
Jackson v. Indiana held it unconstitutional.129 
A person found not guilty by reason of insanity (“NGRI”) may also 
be civilly committed not only after an acquittal for minor charges, but 
also for longer than the maximum prison sentence for the underlying 
offense.130  A state may confine an NGRI acquittee until he is no long-
er mentally ill or no longer dangerous—even if confinement turns 
out to be permanent.131  The Supreme Court has held, however, that 
the proof of the elements of a criminal offense required to raise the 
affirmative defense of insanity is enough to show that an individual is 
 
124 Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 83 (1992).  But see id. at 87–88 (O’Connor, J., concur-
ring) (“It might therefore be permissible for Louisiana to confine an insanity acquittee 
who has regained sanity if, unlike the situation in this case, the nature and duration of 
detention were tailored to reflect pressing public safety concerns related to the acquit-
tee’s continuing dangerousness.”); Note, Commitment Following an Insanity Acquittal, 94 
HARV. L. REV. 605, 607 n.8 (1981). 
125 Stephen J. Morse, Crazy Reasons, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 189, 193 (1999). 
126 Id. 
127 Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975); Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 
(1960); see also Bruce J. Winick, Restructuring Incompetency to Stand Trial, 32 UCLA L. REV. 
921, 923–25 (1985). 
128 Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).  Commitment may be extended if there is a 
dangerousness finding after the defendant may no longer be held for the purpose of as-
certaining competency.  Id. 
129 Michael L. Perlin, “For the Misdemeanor Outlaw”:  The Impact of the ADA on the Institutionali-
zation of Criminal Defendants with Mental Disabilities, 52 ALA. L. REV. 193, 204 (2000) (“As-
tonishingly, more than half the states allow for the indefinite commitment of incompe-
tent-to-stand-trial defendants, in spite of Jackson’s specific language outlawing this 
practice.”). 
130 Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368 (1983). 
131 Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 86 (1992); Jones, 463 U.S. at 368. 
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sufficiently dangerous to be committed.132  Dangerousness is not syn-
onymous with violence in the civil commitment context but also may 
include non-violent antisocial conduct.133  In contrast to competency, 
therefore, insanity acquittees may be committed automatically on the 
basis of their NGRI verdict, without an additional finding of dange-
rousness.134  In addition, states may later place the burden on the de-
fendant to prove he is no longer dangerous enough to be confined.135 
Finally, an increasing number of individuals are civilly committed 
as “sexually dangerous” or “sexually violent.”136  The Minnesota sta-
tute in Serna is typical,137 requiring commitment after completion of a 
criminal sentence for a sex offense if clear and convincing evidence 
shows a “lack of power to control . . . sexual impulses 
and . . . [likelihood of continuing] to engage in acts of harmful sex-
ual conduct.”138  Sexual offenses leading to eligibility for these com-
mitments need not be physically violent, however, or even particularly 
serious.139  Yet the Supreme Court approved these types of commit-
ments in Kansas v. Hendricks140 and later Kansas v. Crane141 on the basis 
of the requirement that an offender is dangerous and has a “mental 
abnormalit[y] . . . that inhibit[s] self-control”—even when that “men-
 
132 Jones, 463 U.S. at 364. 
133 Id. at 365 n.14. 
134 Id. at 365–67. 
135 Cf. id. at 355–57, 370 (upholding a statute requiring an insanity acquittee to prove by a 
preponderance that he is not mentally ill and dangerous to be eligible for release). 
136 E.g., Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 302, 120 
Stat. 587, 620 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 4248 (2006)) (“If, after the hearing, the court finds 
by clear and convincing evidence that the person is a sexually dangerous person, the 
court shall commit the person . . . .”); IOWA CODE § 229A.1 (2010) (“[T]he general as-
sembly finds that a civil commitment procedure for the long-term care and treatment of 
the sexually violent predator is necessary.”).  For a history of sex offender commitment 
statutes, see Peter C. Pfaffenroth, Note, The Need for Coherence:  States’ Civil Commitment of 
Sex Offenders in the Wake of Kansas v. Crane, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2229, 2235–39 (2003). 
137 MINN. STAT. § 253B.02 (2010); see Serna v. Goodno, 567 F.3d 944, 946 (8th Cir. 2009) (cit-
ing Senty-Haugen v. Goodno, 462 F.3d 876, 880–81 (8th Cir. 2006)), cert. denied 130 S. Ct. 
165 (2009). 
138 Senty-Haugen, 462 F.3d at 880. 
139 E.g. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02 (2008) (including any criminal act committed “for the 
purpose of the defendant’s sexual gratification” in the list of offenses creating eligibility 
for sexually violent predator commitment); see also Monica Davey & Abby Goodnough, 
Doubts Rise as States Hold Sex Offenders After Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2007, at A1, available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/04/us/04civil.html (“Sex offenders selected for 
commitment are not always the most violent; some exhibitionists are chosen, for exam-
ple, while rapists are passed over.”). 
140 521 U.S. 346 (1997). 
141 534 U.S. 407, 409 (2002). 
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tal abnormality” is simply a diagnosis of pedophilia.142  The Court 
found that this volitional impairment requirement marked a distinct 
enough subset of supposedly dangerous offenders to be constitution-
al, while a past sex offense conviction coupled with evidence of a 
propensity for recidivism indicated sufficient dangerousness.143 
Notably absent from any of these standards are specific findings of 
propensity for physical violence, use of weapons, self-harm, or drug 
abuse.  Moreover, even though traditional involuntary civil commit-
ment requires a finding of dangerousness to oneself or others, this 
does not always mean that the person has ever committed or at-
tempted to commit a violent or self-harming act.  Many states will ac-
cept mere threats to inflict serious harm, and courts are split over 
whether an objective, outward manifestation of dangerousness is re-
quired at all.144  In sum, commitment criteria do not strongly corre-
late with behaviors that create the security concerns that justify insti-
tutional search policies.  Civil commitments standards therefore do 
not map onto Fourth Amendment analysis. 
It might not be significant that some patients are committed who 
have not been shown to exhibit violent or self-harming behavior if 
these commitments were rare.  But patients who are not committed 
on specific findings of these sorts of behaviors actually constitute a 
significant number of patients receiving twenty-four hour residential 
treatment.145  It is difficult to pinpoint the exact proportion of these 
types of commitments in the total resident psychiatric population of 
the United States.  Commitments are governed by the states, which 
do not aggregate their data and have disparate commitment laws,146 
and studies define psychiatric facility differently.  Populations also 
vary from facility to facility, based on a state’s commitment laws and 
the way facilities are organized.147  Based on rough calculations from 
 
142 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 360 (“Hendricks’ diagnosis as a pedophile, which qualifies as a 
‘mental abnormality’ under the Act, thus plainly suffices for due process purposes.”);.  
Professor Stephen Morse has pointed out that one peculiar aspect of these committals is 
that pedophilia diagnoses may not support an insanity defense against criminal charges.  
Thus, a sex offender may be held criminally culpable at the same time as he is held non-
responsible in civil commitment proceedings.  Stephen Morse, Blame and Danger:  An Es-
say on Preventive Detention, 76 B.U. L. REV. 113, 136 (1996). 
143 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 357–58, 360. 
144 See Virginia Aldigé Hiday, Dangerousness of Civil Commitment Candidates:  A Six-Month Fol-
low-Up, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 551, 555 n.6 (1990). 
145 See infra note 148. 
146 E.g., Hugh McGinley & Richard A. Pasewark, National Survey of the Frequency and Success of 
the Insanity Plea and Alternate Pleas, 17 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 205, 207 (1989). 
147 For example, in California, 92% of patients in state-run psychiatric facilities are commit-
ted through the criminal justice system, whereas most candidates for civil commitment 
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other available estimates, however, 10,000148 or more of the approx-
imately 55,000 individuals hospitalized at a given time149 may not in-
volve any finding of dangerousness in the narrow sense relevant to 
Fourth Amendment concerns—violence, self-harm, or drug abuse.  
In addition, an additional 50% to 85% of patients in a typical residen-
tial facility might be voluntary admissions requiring no legal findings 
for hospitalization.150 
 
are at least initially held in hospital inpatient psychiatric wards or private psychiatric hos-
pitals.  Katharine Mieszkowski, Napa State Hospital’s Grisly Inside Story, BAY CITIZEN (S.F.), 
Dec. 16, 2010, http://www.baycitizen.org/health/story/napa-state-hospitals-grisly-inside-
story; see also Steven P. Segal et al., Factors in the Use of Coercive Retention in Civil Commitment 
Evaluations in Psychiatric Emergency Services, 52 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 514, 515 (2001). 
148 Recent estimates indicate that approximately 4,000 defendants are being held to restore 
competency at any given time.  Hal Wortzel et al., Crisis in the Treatment of Incompetency to 
Proceed to Trial:  Harbinger of a Systemic Illness, 35 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 357, 357 
(2007).  Insanity acquittals are more rare, and few accurate estimates of their number are 
available.  McGinley & Pasewark, supra note 146, at 207 (“[P]olicy makers must still re-
main largely dependent upon limited and sporadic studies conducted by individual re-
searchers or government agencies.”).  An oft-cited estimate, however, is that only about 
0.25% of defendants successfully raise this defense.  E.g., John P. Martin, The Insanity De-
fense:  A Closer Look, WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 1998, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/local/longterm/aron/qa227.htm.  Therefore, based on the number of felony convic-
tions each year in U.S. courts, a reasonable estimate might be about 2,750 NGRI commit-
tals per year.  See Transcript of Oral Argument at 23, Pottawattamie County v. McGhee, 
130 S. Ct. 1047 (2010) (No. 08-1065) (“[T]here were . . . in the year 2006 . . . 1.1, approx-
imately, million felony convictions.”), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/
oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-1065.pdf.  Because insanity committals can be 
quite lengthy—possibly nine times longer than the sentence for the underlying offense—
the number of insanity acquittals per year may significantly under-represent the number 
of insanity acquittees housed at a given time.  See Perlin, supra note 129, at 210.  As for sex 
offenders, as of 2007, 2700 offenders were committed under laws in nineteen states; New 
York has since passed an offender commitment law, bringing the total number of states to 
twenty.  Davey & Goodnough, supra note 139.  Again, because in 2007 only 250 such of-
fenders had ever been released, this figure likely accurately represents the number of sex 
offenders involuntarily hospitalized at a given time.  See id. 
149 SLOBOGIN ET AL., LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 705 (5th ed. 2009).  Bruce Wi-
nick, however, has estimated the total number of individuals subject to involuntary hospi-
talization annually to be as high as 660,000.  BRUCE J. WINICK, CIVIL COMMITMENT:  A 
THERAPEUTIC JUSTICE MODEL 2–3 (2005).  Winick’s number, however, includes some vo-
luntary hospitalizations and does not take into account that many individuals. 
150 SLOBOGIN ET AL., supra note 149, at 857.  Non-forensic facilities often hold a combination 
of voluntarily and involuntarily admitted patients.  See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–
GEN. § 10-632(a) (West 2010) (authorizing involuntary commitments to Veterans Admin-
istration hospitals); SLOBOGIN ET AL., supra note 149, at 708–09 (describing the frequency 
of government contracts with private hospitals for involuntary treatment).  This raises the 
question of whether the requirement of individualized suspicion should simply be go-
verned by the “voluntary” versus “involuntary” status of a patient.  This view could find 
support in the facts of another psychiatric hospital Fourth Amendment case, Aiken v. Nix-
on, 236 F. Supp. 2d 211, 218 (N.D.N.Y 2002), aff’d 80 Fed. App’x 146 (2d Cir. 2003).  In 
Aiken, the Northern District of New York likened psychiatric patients to prison visitors and 
guards, who may be strip-searched only on reasonable suspicion of possessing contra-
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1. The Intersection of Civil Commitment and the Criminal Justice System 
While not all types of involuntary commitment require dange-
rousness findings, some may only occur if the defendant has or is 
suspected of having committed a criminal offense.  It is true that 
these charges might be a good indicator of future conduct, and thus 
“dangerousness,” if there was past dangerous conduct.151  Even so, in 
contrast to pretrial detainees, many, if not most, of those committed 
for incompetency to stand trial are charged with minor offenses.152  
More NGRI defendants than incompetency detainees commit violent 
crimes, but a substantial number—31.6% according to one study—
are committed on the basis of nonviolent offenses.153  Name notwith-
standing, sexually violent predator programs often do not primarily 
target violent sex offenders, and some committed sex offenders are 
simply too old to be violent because so few are ever released from 
commitment.154 
 
band.  Id. at 234.  The plaintiff was a voluntary admit to a state facility that also had invo-
luntary patients.  Id. at 218.  Thus Aiken could be construed as limited by its facts to volun-
tary patients, although the court did not explicitly limit its holding.  Such a rule would 
pose more administrative difficulties than requiring individualized suspicion for all pa-
tients because staff in mixed facilities likely will have more information on, and interest 
in, individual patients’ risk of violent behavior than their legal status.  More importantly, 
the distinction in mental health law between voluntary and involuntary commitments is 
dubious.  A substantial number of decisions to voluntarily enter a residential facility are 
made either while the person is in some sort of official custody or after learning the re-
sults of an involuntary commitment proceeding.  SLOBOGIN ET AL., supra note 149, at 860–
61.  In addition, many commitment decisions are made while individuals are incompetent 
or are the result of coercion.  Robert D. Miller, The Continuum of Coercion:  Constitutional 
and Clinical Considerations in the Treatment of Mentally Disordered Persons, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 
1169, 1173–75 (1997); Michael L. Perlin, Hospitalized Patients and the Right to Sexual Interac-
tion:  Beyond the Law Frontier?, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE, 517, 522–23 n.26 (1994). 
151 Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997). 
152 Bruce J. Winick, Reforming Incompetency to Stand Trial and Plead Guilty:  A Restated Proposal 
and a Response to Professor Bonnie, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 571, 591 n.102, (1995) 
(“[Forty-two percent] of incompetency commitments were of persons charged with mis-
demeanors; 20-25% were charged with disorderly conduct.” (citing Walter Dickey, Incom-
petency and the Nondangerous Mentally Ill Client, 16 CRIM. L. BULL. 22, 30–31 (1980))); id. at 
593 (“[A] high percentage of incompetency cases arise out of misdemeanor 
charges . . . .”). 
153 Eric Silver et al., Demythologizing Inaccurate Perceptions of the Insanity Defense, 18 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 63, 67 (1994). 
154 Davey & Goodnough, supra note 139 (“[Two hundred fifty] offenders [of 2,700 commit-
ted have been] released unconditionally since the first law was passed in 
1990 . . . . [S]ome exhibitionists are chosen [for commitment], for example, while rapists 
are passed over.  And some are past the age at which some scientists consider them most 
dangerous.  In Wisconsin, a 102-year-old who wears a sport coat to dinner cannot partici-
pate in treatment because of memory lapses and poor hearing.”).  But see Eric S. Janus, 
The Use of Social Science and Medicine in Sex Offender Commitment, 23 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & 
CIV. CONFINEMENT 347, 376 n.126 (1997) (“‘[T]he pure sex offender is a rarity; instead, 
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In short, these patients’ alleged or past criminal conduct may sug-
gest a propensity to do something, but not necessarily to commit dan-
gerous acts involving contraband that could be the object of a search.  
Rather, these patients’ conduct suggests they might have a propensity 
to, for example, be disorderly, shoplift, commit sexual acts with mi-
nors, or expose themselves in public.  Empirical data supports this in-
tuition.  Although some researchers argue that forensic patients 
commit more serious assaults when they are violent, they have consis-
tently been found to have lower rates of assault once institutionalized 
than patients committed after a civil determination of dangerous-
ness.155 
Even conceding that some NGRI defendants or sex offenders may 
have a propensity for violent acts for which contraband such as wea-
pons or drugs might be useful or triggering, in order to qualify for an 
NGRI verdict or sex offender commitment the behavior must be cau-
sally connected to a mental disorder.156  If a predilection for violent 
behavior is linked to a patient’s illness, the behavior should be ex-
pected to subside if the patient has been in the institution for more 
than a short period and is responding to treatment.157  Research on 
hospital violence supports this point:  violent incidents tend to occur 
most frequently right after commitment and subside after time in the 
hospital.158 
One objection might be that regardless of actual dangerousness, 
incompetency and insanity committees are still entitled to less consi-
derate treatment than sex offenders or traditional involuntary com-
mittees based on their quasi-criminal legal status.159  For example, as 
 
sex offenses are single or infrequent and often are embedded in an extensive criminal 
history of property and violent crimes.’” (quoting Leonore M.J. Simon, The Myth of Sex Of-
fender Specialization:  An Empirical Analysis, 23 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 
387, 392 (1997))). 
155 Donald M. Linhorst & Lisa Parker Scott, Assaultive Behavior in State Psychiatric Hospitals:  
Differences Between Forensic and Nonforensic Patients, 19 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 857, 868 
(2004) (“The results of this study are consistent with findings from previous studies that 
forensic patients are less likely to commit assaults than nonforensic patients in psychiatric 
hospitals.” (citations omitted)). 
156 Morse, supra note 125, at 193. 
157 See Hiday, supra note 144, at 553 (“Regardless of definition [of dangerousness] or admis-
sion grounds, most dangerous behavior occurred within the first 7–10 days of admission, 
and most of that occurred on the first day and tended not to be repeated.” (citations 
omitted)). 
158 Simon Davis, Violence by Psychiatric Inpatients:  A Review, 42 HOSP. & COMMUNITY 
PSYCHIATRY 585, 586 (1991). 
159 E.g., Chris Kempner, Comment, Unfair Punishment of the Mentally Disabled?  The Constitutio-
nality of Treating Extremely Dangerous and Mentally Ill Insanity Acquittees in Prison Facilities, 23 
U. HAW. L. REV. 623, 627 (2001) (arguing prisons should take over the care of insanity 
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the Seventh Circuit has pointed out, a plaintiff may not object to 
Bell’s due process holding when, in addition to his civilly committed 
status, he is also a pretrial detainee.160 
In the case of NGRI defendants, however, the significance of the 
criminal “conviction” to their legal status is minimal.  The NGRI de-
fendant is no longer a pretrial detainee because there is a verdict in 
his case.  At the same time, the successful affirmative NGRI defense 
has made him ineligible for punishment because of a lack of culpabil-
ity.161  While proof beyond a reasonable doubt of a criminal act justi-
fies fewer procedural protections before commitment of NGRI de-
fendants, NGRI commitment is nevertheless not a criminal sentence 
and remains civil in character.162  NGRI defendants’ legal status there-
fore differs minimally from that of other involuntarily committed de-
tainees and does not alone justify abrogating their Fourth Amend-
ment rights. 
Although it is true that the incompetent to stand trial have crimi-
nal charges pending for which they may be tried if they gain compe-
tence, they nevertheless are not comparable to competent pretrial 
detainees.  Because they are not competent to stand trial, they are in-
eligible for criminal conviction and punishment in much the same 
way as NGRI defendants.  Additionally, the incompetent to stand trial 
and competent pretrial detainees differ in ways that are relevant to 
the security risks that justified the Bell standard for pretrial detainee 
searches.  Pretrial detention in both the state and federal systems is 
not an automatic consequence of criminal charges.  Detention de-
pends to a great degree on the nature of the offense and other fac-
tors pointing to a defendant’s dangerousness.163  Indeed, nearly two-
thirds of felony defendants alone are released on bail.164 
 
acquittees who have committed a violent crime and may do so because they do not have 
“true civil status”). 
160 Allison v. Snyder, 332 F.3d 1076, 1079 (7th Cir. 2003) (“And one must keep in mind that 
they are pretrial detainees as well as civil committees:  criminal charges against them are 
pending.”)  Allison v. Snyder was an unusual case in that the plaintiffs were part of a pre-
trial diversion program for sex offenders where civil commitment would occur in lieu of 
trial, but criminal charges remained open until successful completion of treatment.  Id. at 
1078; see also Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 366–70 (1986).  The Allison court’s characteri-
zation of these offenders is not typical of incompetency commitments, as criminal 
charges are normally dismissed if competency is not restored. 
161 See, e.g., Kyron Huigens, Solving the Apprendi Puzzle, 90 GEO. L.J. 387, 419 (2002). 
162 John Parry, The Civil-Criminal Dichotomy in Insanity Commitment and Release Proceedings:  
Hinckley and Other Matters, 11 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 218, 218–19 (1987). 
163 Judges have wide discretion in setting bail amounts, but they typically factor prior convic-
tions and the seriousness of the offense into their decisions.  Preventive detention with-
out bail is usually limited to the most serious or violent offenses, and often also requires a 
prior criminal record.  See MARC L. MILLER & RONALD F. WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES:  
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In contrast, almost all incompetent defendants are committed re-
gardless of the degree of the offense, and usually without the option 
of quickly disposing of minor cases through a guilty plea.165  Further-
more, recall that a large proportion of those held for incompetency 
to stand trial are charged with minor offenses.166  If these defendants 
were not mentally ill or disabled, many of them would not be subject 
to pretrial detention at all.  Moreover, when competent misdemeanor 
offenders are detained, in most jurisdictions—including the Eighth 
Circuit—they are ineligible for suspicionless strip searches.167  The re-
sult is that incompetent detainees are subject to less Fourth Amend-
ment protection while in custody solely on the basis of their mental 
illness or impairment. 
2. Predicting Dangerousness 
Of the individuals committed under traditional civil commitment 
criteria, most are committed either for lack of self-care, inability to 
avoid physical harm, or dangerousness to themselves, rather than vi-
olence toward others.168  Even among those involuntarily committed 
specifically for dangerousness to others, however, the weight such a 
finding should carry in Fourth Amendment analysis is questionable.  
While the Supreme Court has taken the position that “from a legal 
point of view there is nothing inherently unattainable about a predic-
tion of future criminal conduct,” this assertion flies in the face of em-
 
CASES, STATUTES, AND EXECUTIVE MATERIALS 856–60, 877 (3d ed. 2007).  Socioeconomic 
factors might confound the link between pretrial detention and violence or seriousness of 
the offense, although the practice of bail bond dealing might lessen their effects.  Id. at 
858–59 (describing the role of bail bond dealers in ameliorating the race and gender dis-
parities in pretrial release). 
164 Id. at 857. 
165 Perlin, supra note 129, at 203–04 (“When defendants are incompetent to stand trial, the 
overwhelming majority are committed to state hospitals.”); Winick, supra note 152, at 591 
(“Defendants arrested for a petty offense, such as disorderly conduct or shoplifting, can 
usually plead guilty and pay a small fine.  If those defendants are incompetent to stand 
trial, however, they may face many months of incarceration . . . . If defendants eventually 
are restored to competency and returned to court, they probably will accept the same 
plea bargain at that point.”). 
166 See supra note 152 and accompanying text. 
167 See Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 621 F.3d 296, 299 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting that 
ten circuit courts of appeal had held that reasonable suspicion was required to strip 
search detainees charged with “minor offenses” since Bell, but that the Ninth and Ele-
venth Circuits had recently reversed their rulings on the issue), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 
1816 (2011); Jones v. Edwards, 770 F.2d 739, 741 (8th Cir. 1985) (following decisions by 
the Seventh and Tenth Circuits). 
168 Hiday, supra note 144, at 553. 
June 2011] PRISONERS OF THE MIND 1463 
 
pirical data on the accuracy of dangerousness predictions in the con-
text of civil commitment decisions.169 
Prediction of dangerousness among the mentally ill has long been 
controversial.170  Studies suggest that little stock can be placed in 
mental health professionals’ clinical judgments of dangerousness be-
cause of a high false positive rate.171  Clinicians are better able to cap-
ture the individuals who end up committing violent acts than they are 
at excluding those who do not.172  Although their accuracy is more 
impressive when the low base rate of violent behavior is taken into ac-
count, their absolute accuracy is still quite low.173  Courts have never-
theless traditionally relied on these types of predictions in legal de-
terminations and continue to do so today.174 
Actuarial or statistical predictive tools, which are considered more 
accurate than clinical violence predictions, have only recently be-
come available in the form of violence risk assessment instruments 
(“VRAIs”).175  While VRAIs consistently have been shown to be supe-
rior to clinical prediction, measures of their validity are perhaps mis-
leading.  Favorable validation studies of these assessments have been 
based on a statistical tool that calculates the probability of a patient 
who was later violent having a higher VRAI score than one who was 
 
169 Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997) (quoting Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 
278 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
170 Michael L. Perlin et al., Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Men-
tally Disabled Persons:  Hopeless Oxymoron or Path to Redemption?, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 
80, 87 & n.58 (1995). 
171 John Monahan, A Jurisprudence of Risk Assessment:  Forecasting Harm Among Prisoners, Preda-
tors, and Patients, 92 VA. L. REV. 391, 406–07 (2006) (“[O]f the patients predicted to be 
violent by the clinicians, one-in-two later committed a violent act, while of the patients 
predicted to be safe, one-in-three later committed a violent act.”).  Clinical prediction 
usually occurs after the mental health professional interviews the subject.  The profes-
sional asks questions “designed to determine the individual’s current mental status and to 
obtain a life history,” and draws inferences from the information in the answers, “pre-
sumably based on the interviewer’s professional education, training, and experience.”  
Christopher Slobogin, Dangerousness and Expertise, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 97, 109 (1984). 
172 Monahan, supra note 171, at 406–07 (“Patients who elicited professional concern regard-
ing future violence were moderately more likely to be violent after discharge (fifty-three 
percent) than were patients who had not attracted such concern (thirty-six percent).”). 
173 Slobogin, supra note 171, at 112–13 (noting that clinical predictions of experienced pro-
fessionals were three times better than chance). 
174 Monahan, supra note 171, at 407; Slobogin, supra note 171, at 109. 
175 Monahan, supra note 171, at 408.  Actuarial prediction involves combining an individual’s 
traits known to be linked to violent behavior to arrive at a probability that he will behave 
violently.  Slobogin, supra note 171, at 109–10. 
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not.176  In the case of two particularly celebrated VRAIs, this figure was 
around seventy percent.177 
As one commentator notes, what this assessment really shows is 
that these studies are better predictors of a binary outcome—violence 
versus no violence—than chance, which would be expected to group 
fifty percent of patients correctly.178  That is, the verification method 
indicates little about a particular individual’s propensity for violence 
or recidivism but rather distinguishes between group members.  It 
simply “tells us that seventy of those [one hundred] ranked, whether 
[violent] or not, were ranked correctly,” without indicating the 
chances that a particular individual is one of that correctly ranked se-
venty percent, and much less whether he should be in the violent cat-
egory.179  In addition, “slippage,” or a difference between validation 
statistics and actual violence or recidivism, can occur because of dif-
ferences between the study population and the populations on which 
it is later used.180  Most VRAIs are based on data on, and are aimed at 
calculating the probability of, criminal recidivism or violent behavior 
upon discharge from the hospital.181 
Although this metric may be most relevant to deciding whether an 
individual should be involuntarily committed to protect the public, 
research indicates that it has little relevance to the probability of vio-
lent behavior in a hospital environment.182  Assaultive behavior during 
inpatient treatment has been shown to be a poor indicator of vi-
olence outside the hospital, and each results from different risk fac-
tors.183  Even an accurate VRAI result may not indicate any probability 
 
176 The statistical tool is known as “Receiver Operator Characteristic,” or ROC, which is de-
scribed in John A. Fennel, Punishment by Another Name:  The Inherent Overreaching in Sexual-
ly Dangerous Person Commitments, 35 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 37, 54–55 
(2009). 
177 The Classification of Violence Risk (“COVR”), created from data collected during the 
most comprehensive violence study to date, the MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment 
Study; and the STATIC-99, which estimates recidivism among sex offenders.  For citations 
describing the MacArthur Study, see generally Monahan, supra note 171, at 411 n.80. 
178 For a much more detailed discussion of the methodological problems with risk assess-
ment instruments, see generally Fennel, supra note 176, on whom I draw throughout the 
next two paragraphs of analysis. 
179 Id. at 54–55. 
180 Id. at 57–58. 
181 Patrick Lussier et al., Chronic Violent Patients in an Inpatient Psychiatric Hospital:  Prevalence, 
Description, and Identification, 37 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 5, 5–6 (2010). 
182 See id. (“[A] pattern of violent behavior manifested during inpatient treatment is not nec-
essarily indicative of an increased risk of violence following discharge.” (citations omit-
ted)). 
183 Id. at 6 (“[P]erpetration of violence during inpatient treatment may be influenced by dif-
ferent risk factors than those influencing the commission of community violence.”). 
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of misconduct in an institutional environment because this is not 
what the instrument was designed to measure.  These issues with pre-
dictive instruments therefore cast doubt on claims that the civilly 
committed can be presumed dangerous, even when the most cutting-
edge methods are used to make the prediction. 
Whether or not predictive instruments to identify the violent or 
sexually compulsive among the mentally ill are accurate, civil com-
mitment hearings are usually non-adversarial, “rubber stamp” pro-
ceedings whose reliability is questionable.184  While a formal hearing is 
required, commitment candidates’ own attorneys often abdicate their 
adversarial role in favor of a “best interests” approach, resulting in lit-
tle testing of the evidence in favor of confinement.185  In addition, 
judges almost always defer to the recommendations of the state-
provided expert witness.186  Many judges follow the expert’s recom-
mendation more than ninety-five percent of the time.187  This is par-
ticularly significant because of the strong incentive for experts to 
over-recommend commitment out of fear of liability under Tarasoff v. 
Regents of the University of California,188 which some commentators ar-
gue has approached a phobic level among mental health profession-
als.189 
 
184 Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Civil Commitment Hearing, 10 J. CONTEMP. 
LEGAL ISSUES 37, 40–42 (1999) (citations omitted). 
185 Id. at 40–41.  This relaxed advocacy might be less true with respect to sex offender com-
mitments because the defense bar has vigorously opposed these statutes, primarily on 
double jeopardy and ex post facto grounds.  See, e.g., Fennel, supra note 176, at 39 (dis-
cussing shortcomings of a Massachusetts statute that aims to determine which sex offend-
ers are at a high risk for reoffending, such that they ought to be civilly committed). 
186 See Winick, supra note 184, at 41–42 (“[J]udicial agreement with expert witnesses in this 
area ranges from seventy-nine to one hundred percent, and most frequently exceeds ni-
nety-five percent.”). 
187 Id. 
188 551 P.2d 334, 353 (Cal. 1976) (holding a therapist civilly liable for the murder of a wom-
an by his patient when the therapist heard his patient threatened to kill her, because he 
failed to warn the victim). 
189 Michael L. Perlin, Tarasoff and the Dilemma of the Dangerous Patient:  New Directions for the 
1990’s, 16 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 29, 45–47 (1992) (citing, inter alia, Stanley L. Brodsky, 
Fear of Litigation in Mental Health Professionals, 15 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 492, 496, 497 
(1988)); id. at 61–62 (1992) (citing, inter alia, Stanley L. Brodsky, Fear of Litigation in Men-
tal Health Professionals, 15 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 492, 497 (1988)). 
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V.  INSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS 
A. Security in Psychiatric Hospitals and Prisons 
Even if the accuracy of dangerousness predictions is suspect, psy-
chiatric hospitals may still be so dangerous as to make blanket search 
policies reasonable.  Unfortunately, reliable statistics regarding rates 
of violence or possession of contraband in psychiatric hospitals versus 
prisons are not available.190  In official estimates for both types of facil-
ities, violent incidents are drastically underreported.191  In addition, 
researchers’ estimates are based on such disparate metrics that any 
comparison between available studies on psychiatric hospital and 
prison misconduct would be misleading.192 
Nevertheless, while not to minimize the dangers that hospital per-
sonnel and patients might face, some research indicates that the 
threat of serious misconduct—particularly involving contraband or 
weapons—is low in psychiatric facilities.193  It is true that assaultive or 
aggressive behavior is increasing in inpatient facilities, and rates of 
workplace injury of staff are much higher than in other occupa-
tions.194  Even so, “civil commitment candidates do not tend to be 
dangerous, much less violent, within the 6 months following” com-
mitment, and “[t]hose who behave[] dangerously rarely inflict[] in-
jury.”195  Furthermore, patient aggression more often takes the form 
 
190 See JOHN J. GIBBONS & NICHOLAS DE B. KATZENBACH, CONFRONTING CONFINEMENT, A 
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON SAFETY AND ABUSE IN AMERICA’S PRISONS, 24–25 (2006), 
available at http://www.prisoncommission.org/pdfs/Confronting_Confinement.pdf (de-
scribing “imprecision and unreliability of the data on assaults”); Ralph Slovenko, Com-
mentary, Violent Attacks in Psychiatric and Other Hospitals, 34 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 249, 249 
(2006) (noting that “the actual number of attacks in hospitals is inexact” and that “there 
is no national reporting system” of hospital violence). 
191 GIBBONS & DE B. KATZENBACH, supra note 190, at 24–25; Slovenko, supra note 190, at 249–
50. 
192 Compare, e.g., Nancy Wolff et al., Physical Violence Inside Prisons:  Rates of Victimization, 34 
CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 588, 593, 595 (2007) (estimating the percentage of prison inmates 
who had been victims of assault and the number of assaults per 1000 inmates), with Lin-
horst & Scott, supra note 155, at 864 (measuring the percentage of patients who commit-
ted acts of violence and the rate of assault per one hundred days). 
193 See e.g., Davis, supra note 158, at 585 (noting studies that support the conclusion “that se-
rious incidents are rare”); Hiday, supra note 144, at 562 (noting that those who did be-
have dangerously “rarely inflicted injury”).  But see Slovenko, supra note 190, at 249 
(“[T]he actual number of attacks in hospitals . . . is considered to be extensive.”). 
194 Slovenko, supra note 190, at 249–51. 
195 Hiday, supra note 144, at 562 (“[W]e found candidates to be far less dangerous and vio-
lent after going through the civil commitment process.”). 
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of verbal threats than violent attacks, except during instances when 
staff are administering medication.196 
Although rates of assault remain high, serious violence in prisons 
has also decreased over the past thirty years to fairly low levels; in fact, 
as of 2003, the homicide rate in prisons was lower than that of the 
general population.197  This decrease in serious prison violence might 
suggest that the levels of violence and the security concerns of psy-
chiatric hospitals and prisons are comparable and that, therefore, 
similar search policies will be reasonable in both contexts.  The de-
crease also raises the point in Bell, however, that little contraband had 
been discovered in that facility precisely because the search policy was 
an effective deterrent.198  In recent years, prisons have implemented 
increasingly aggressive security interventions.199  Notably, many of the 
most difficult-to-control inmates are now totally isolated from other 
inmates, and largely prison personnel as well, in what is basically 
permanent solitary confinement.200  Serious violence and weapons 
could similarly be rare in psychiatric facilities because of discovery or 
deterrence through searches, but this argument is less convincing.  As 
opposed to prisons, which uniformly seem to maintain broad search 
policies regardless of security level, psychiatric hospitals appear to 
vary widely in their security practices, which therefore may not play as 
great a causal role in the level of serious violence overall as in pris-
ons.201 
Another significant way in which the security concerns of prisons 
differ from those in psychiatric hospitals is the role of prison gangs in 
violent incidents and smuggling of contraband.  Gangs are responsi-
ble for a large proportion of prison violence,202 and membership cor-
 
196 Slovenko, supra note 190, at 251. 
197 Alan Gomez, States Work to Curb Prison Violence, USA TODAY, Aug. 24, 2008, 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-08-21-prisondeaths_N.htm. 
198 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979) (“That there has been only one instance where 
an MCC inmate was discovered attempting to smuggle contraband into the institution on 
his person may be more a testament to the effectiveness of this search technique as a de-
terrent than to any lack of interest on the part of the inmates to secrete and import such 
items when the opportunity arises.” (footnote omitted)). 
199 See, e.g., Gomez, supra note 197. 
200 See Sharon Shalev, Solitary, NEW HUMANIST, Jan.–Feb. 2011, http://newhumanist.org.uk/
2479/solitary (discussing use of “supermax confinement” to safely manage the “worst of 
the worst” predators in the prison system). 
201 See, e.g., Brief of Appellant at 26–42, Serna v. Goodno, 567 F.3d 944 (8th Cir. 2009) (No. 
05-3441), (discussing another sex offender treatment facility in Minnesota with the same 
security level as the facility in Serna that centered its inmate search policy around proba-
ble cause). 
202 See John Winterdyk & Rick Ruddell, Managing Prison Gangs:  Results from a Survey of U.S. 
Prison Systems, 38 J. CRIM. JUST. 730, 731 (2010) (“[A] recent study by the Department of 
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relates significantly with both violent behavior and disobeying prison 
rules in general, including possession of drugs.203  Moreover, gangs 
are a major, if not the primary, source of contraband within pris-
ons.204  Manipulation of prison personnel and maintenance of net-
works outside the prison significantly contribute to inmate gangs’ 
ability to arrange for contraband to be brought to the prison and past 
prison security.205  Competition for control of contraband “rackets” is 
itself a precipitant of prison violence.206 
In contrast, gangs do not seem to be among the main factors asso-
ciated with violence in psychiatric facilities.  While there are some 
anecdotal reports of gang activity in psychiatric facilities that primari-
ly house patients committed during the criminal justice process,207 
gangs do not appear in the literature on violence risk factors.  In-
stead, studies suggest that low expenditures on care and environmen-
tal stressors are some of the most significant predictors of ward vi-
olence.208 
B. Individualized Suspicion:  Administrative Feasibility and Deference to 
Institutional Decision-making 
Perhaps consistent with the difficulty of dangerousness prediction, 
numerous studies have concluded that a small number of patients are 
responsible for the majority of violent outbursts in inpatient psychia-
tric facilities.209  In one study, 56% of violent episodes were the fault 
 
Corrections for Washington State reported that gang members . . . accounted for 43 per-
cent of all major violent infractions inside their prisons.” (citation omitted)). 
203 See Gerald G. Gaes et al., The Influence of Prison Gang Affiliation on Violence and Other Prison 
Misconduct, 82 PRISON J. 359, 360–61, 381 (2002) (discussing research that shows that 
prison gang affiliation increases the probability of violence and other prison miscon-
duct). 
204 George W. Knox, The Problem of Gangs and Security Threat Groups (STG’s) in American Prisons 
Today:  Recent Research Findings From the 2004 Prison Gang Survey, NAT’L GANG CRIME 
RESEARCH CTR. (2005), available at http://www.ngcrc.com/ngcrc/corr2006.html; Win-
terdyk & Ruddell, supra note 202, at 731. 
205 Winterdyk & Ruddell, supra note 202, at 731. 
206 See Knox, supra note 204 (“For example, in March of 2004, a prison riot in Puerto Rico 
resulted in two inmates killed and five wounded, which was started by gang members 
fighting over who would control the a [sic] shipment of illegal drugs . . . .”). 
207 See Mieszkowski, supra note 147 (noting one treatment facility, Napa State Hospital, that is 
“rife with gang activity, methamphetamine use, pimping and extortion”). 
208 Michael Daffern & Kevin Howells, Psychiatric Inpatient Aggression:  A Review of Structural and 
Functional Assessment Approaches, 7 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 477, 487 (2002); 
Laurent S. Lehmann et al., A Survey of Assaultive Behavior in Veterans Health Administration 
Facilities, 50 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 384, 386 (1999). 
209 E.g., Raymond B. Flannery, Jr., Repetitively Assaultive Psychiatric Patients:  Review of Published 
Findings, 1978–2001, 73 PSYCHIATRIC Q. 229, 231 (2002); John E. Kraus & Brian B. Sheit-
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of 1.4% of patients.210  Moreover, evidence points to levels of violence 
decreasing sharply after initial intake.211  There is therefore empirical 
justification for search policies targeting newly admitted patients 
beyond the fact that intake is the most obvious point of entry for con-
traband. 
More importantly, these findings suggest that an individualized 
suspicion standard may not be so difficult to implement.  Predicting 
violence in patients after hospital admittance is hardly easier than be-
fore commitment.  Nevertheless, the concentration of violent beha-
vior in a few patients might still give staff a good idea of which pa-
tients pose the most risk based on their day-to-day interactions, past 
violent behavior in the institutional setting, progress in treatment, 
and stage of illness.  Staff might be able to use these intuitions as a 
starting point to target particular patients when there is a potential 
security breach. 
These findings also suggest a role for deference to institutional 
judgment.  As long as the hospital administrators could show some 
effort was made to differentiate between individual patients, courts 
could review their judgment that individualized suspicion existed as 
to a particular patient under a deferential standard.  This would allow 
courts to avoid making treatment or medical judgments that they are 
incompetent to perform, while still allowing for protection of pa-
tients’ constitutional rights.  For the involuntarily committed, a de-
gree of court involvement with institutional affairs may not only be 
appropriate, but also necessary in light of their well-documented vul-
nerability and difficulty asserting their rights on their own.212 
 
man, Characteristics of Violent Behavior in a Large State Psychiatric Hospital, 55 PSYCHIATRIC 
SERVS. 183, 183 (2004). 
210 Kraus & Sheitman, supra note 209, at 183. 
211 Lehmann et al., supra note 208, at 387 (“The admitting and triage areas . . . had the 
second highest rate per work unit of assaultive behavior.”); Hiday, supra note 144, at 553 
(“Regardless of definition or admission grounds, most dangerous behavior occurred with-
in the first 7–10 days of admission, and most of that occurred on the first day and tended 
not to be repeated.” (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted)).  But see Lehmann et al., su-
pra note 208, at 386 (“Length of stay was strongly associated with the rate of assaultive in-
cidents per patient . . . .”). 
212 See Robbins v. Budke, 739 F. Supp. 1479, 1486 (D.N.M. 1990) (“[M]any mentally ill indi-
viduals have difficulty recognizing the concept that they have rights and will not necessar-
ily identify even the most egregious abuse as a violation of their rights.  Even if cognizant 
of their rights, many of these individuals have difficulty assessing whether their rights 
have been violated . . . . In addition, both the effects of medications and of mental illness 
may cause confusion and problems with memory, making it difficult to remember and 
explain possible rights violations after the lapse of several days . . . . [T]he combined ef-
fects of medication, mental illness, and the passive characteristic of institutionalized 
people would inhibit many residents from initiating a phone call to a stranger to talk 
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CONCLUSION 
Neither comparisons of the two groups in precedent, nor the legal 
status of the civilly committed, justifies this association.  On the con-
trary, the involuntarily committed can be distinguished from pretrial 
detainees because of their right to be free from punishment and the 
treatment purposes of their confinement.  Furthermore, not all forms 
of civil commitment require dangerousness findings, and there is rea-
son to believe that such findings are inaccurate predictors of miscon-
duct during inpatient treatment.  There is also little empirical evi-
dence of the similarity of psychiatric hospital and prison population 
behavior during confinement, whereas there is some evidence indi-
cating that the security concerns they raise are disparate. 
This Comment does not assert that involuntarily committed pa-
tients never pose security risks or that psychiatric facilities do not face 
significant administrative problems.  Rather, it is meant to cast doubt 
on the assumption that the danger involuntarily committed patients 
pose as a group is so great that they should be analogized to the cri-
minally accused and treated almost as harshly as convicted prisoners.  
Under civil commitment standards as they are currently structured, 
this assumption is unwarranted.  At the same time, the problem may 
not lie so much with Fourth Amendment analyses that assume that 
the involuntarily committed are likely to be dangerous, as with using 
civil commitment procedures to incapacitate extremely dangerous 
individuals who have slipped through the cracks of the criminal jus-
tice system.  Indeed, the continued viability of a strong criminal-civil 
distinction in constitutional law has been a topic of much discussion 
since the rise of sex offender commitment statutes.213  Nevertheless, as 
long as this “distinction is one that the Supreme Court continues to 
take seriously,”214 the distinction between the Fourth Amendment 
rights of the involuntarily committed and the criminally confined 
should be vigorously enforced as well through a requirement of indi-
vidualized suspicion for searches of patients’ persons. 
 
about problems they are having in the institution.”), quoted in Kelsey McCowan Heilman, 
Comment, The Rights of Others:  Protection and Advocacy Organizations’ Associational Standing 
to Sue, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 237, 273–74 (2008). 
213 See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Two Systems of Social Protection:  Comments on the Civil-
Criminal Distinction, with Particular Reference to Sexually Violent Predator Laws, 7 J. CONTEMP. 
LEGAL ISSUES 69, 76–80 (1996) (discussing the importance of the civil-criminal distinction 
in light of states’ “sexually violent predator” statutes). 
214 Id. at 78. 
